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Abstract
In this paper, we present a procedure to apply the social labeling technique as a social marketing tool. Four studies indicate that communicating
a social label, following an environmentally friendly behavior that is not motivated by pro-environmental concerns, leads consumers to re-attribute
that behavior as representing their own environmental concern. Subsequently, they are likely to act upon their resulting self-perception as an
environmentally friendly person. Social labeling is more successful when cognitive resources are distracted, either at the moment of processing the
label or at the moment of making decisions related to the content of the label.
© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Several researchers have identified the decision of whether to
behave pro-environmentally as a social dilemma (e.g., Cialdini,
Reno, & Kallgren, 1990; Wiener & Doescher, 1991). Choosing
to conserve the environment is considered to be pro-social
because it serves the long-term interests of society. On the other
hand,behavioralcostsassociatedwiththistypeofaction,suchas
money, time, effort, and inconvenience (Pieters, Bijmolt, van
Raaij,&deKruijk,1998;Thøgersen,1994),temptindividualsto
make selfish choices. The challenge of social marketers is to
persuadeindividualstoactforthebenefitofsociety.Inthesocial
marketing tradition, the strategies chosen for this aim typically
rely on the assumption that it is necessary to provoke active
contemplation of behavioral alternatives (Andreasen, 1995).For
example, Wiener and Doescher (1991) propose that consumers
need to be convinced that the collective goal is worth pursuing
and that it is likely to materialize. Further, they claim that social
marketers should emphasize the importance of each individual's
contribution. However, the traditional social marketing ap-
proach has not always met with success. We propose a comple-
mentary strategy that consists of subtly activating the right
(environmental) values and goals at the appropriate time. We
present the social labeling technique, which builds on this
principle, as a promising method for promoting pro-environ-
mental conduct. In four studies, we tested the possibilities and
scope of this procedure.
1. The traditional social marketing approach
Social marketing efforts typically rely on the assumption that
is essential to provoke active contemplation of behavioral
alternatives (Andreasen, 1995). Therefore they often rely on
educational and information-based strategies. Informative,
argument-based pro-environmental messages are essential
tools to educate and sensitize a target audience on important
issues. However, caution is required, as research documents
several mechanisms through which these messages might miss
their aim or even backfire, such as psychological reactance
(Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Reich & Robertson, 1979), fear control
(Witte & Allen, 2000), descriptive norm meta-messages implied
in social marketing communication (Cialdini, 2003), or
consumers solving elicited cognitive dissonance by altering
their attitudes rather than their behavior (Albarracín & McNatt,
2005). Making people think about why they should act
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notaswell(Warlop,Smeesters,&VandenAbeele,2003,p.205).
Making people think about the public benefits of an action is
likely to make them consider the private costs of the same
behavior (Albarracin & Wyer, 2001). Additionally, this could
alsoleadtothinkingabouttheprivatebenefitsofalternatives.As
private costs and benefits are usually more salient than public
costs and benefits (Rothschild, 1979), such a deliberation
process is likely to end with an individual choosing the selfish
option (i.e., the non-environmentally friendly behavior).
2. Values versus behavior
Because of the aforementioned reasons, promoting pro-
environmental (consumer) behavior has proven to be a tough
task. Notwithstanding, social marketers have been successful at
creating awareness of environmental problems, and many
people have adopted ecological preservation values (EC, 2005).
Thus, a value–behavior gap has developed (Kollmuss &
Agyeman, 2002). It seems that traditional social marketing
actions may benefit from a complementary strategy, one that
helps translate these acquired values into preservation behavior.
Many consumer choices are executed as part of a continuous
stream of behaviors that are executed fairly automatically, based
on minimal informational input (Alba, Hutchinson, & Lynch,
1991; Warlop et al., 2003). We consider low-involvement
choices with an environmental impact to be no exception. In a
decision situation, the value that is temporarily most salient and
perceived to be most relevant determines the behavioral choice.
Construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2000) predicts that
positive beliefs about a goal or value are more readily accessible
in long-term decisions, whereas negative beliefs related to that
goal (e.g., the difficulty to obtain it) predominate in short-term
decisions. When challenged to contemplate the environmental
impact of behavior alternatives by social marketing messages,
one thinks about future behavior in an abstract way. In this case,
positive beliefs related to conservation behavior are likely to be
salient.Thismayleadtomakingpersonalresolutionstoactupon
this value in the future. However, in the here and now of making
a decision, the benefits of a concrete, lower-order goal that
serves self-interest are likely to be more salient than those of a
higher-order preservation goal. In a heuristic decision process
based on minimal information input, these proximal and salient
personalconsequencesaremorelikelytobespontaneouslyatthe
top of one's mind. A complementary social marketing approach
could then consist of making relevant (pro-environmental)
thoughts more accessible at the moment of decision making
(Huffman,Ratneshwar,&Mick,2003).Wewilltestthepotential
of the social labeling technique for this aim.
3. Social labeling
Social labeling is a persuasion technique that consists of
providing a person with a statement about his or her personality
orvalues(i.e.,thesociallabel)inanattempttoprovoke behavior
that is consistent with the label. The technique is believed to rely
on a self-perception process and the fact that one's (interpreta-
tion of) past behavior guides future action (Albarracín &
McNatt, 2005; Burger & Caldwell, 2003; Ouellette & Wood,
1998; Tybout & Yalch, 1980). According to Bem's (1972) self-
perceptiontheory,peoplegettoknowthemselvesmuchlikethey
develop a perception of the values and traits of others: by
observingbehaviorandattributingittoeitherinternalorexternal
influences. When they “see” themselves engaging in a certain
activity in the absence of any apparent external reasons, such as
incentives or social pressure, that behavior is attributed
internally. It informs the individual about his or her personality
traits and values. Previous research showed that social labels,
provided by others, can be an important source of information
about an individual's traits and values and can guide future
decisions (Strenta & DeJong, 1981). Because people prefer their
actions to be consistent with their self-perceptions (Wells &
Iyengar, 2005), we suggest that activating consumers' self-
perceptions as environmentally friendly people should promote
pro-environmental decision making.
An early example of the effect of social labels is offered by
Miller, Brickman and Bolen (1975). Describing a group of fifth-
graders as tidy was more efficient in making them keep their
classroom free of litter than an explicit plea for tidiness.
Similarly, Allen (1982) showed that labeling a certain social
group (“American consumers are willing participants in solving
the energy problem”) in television commercials increases these
people's intentions to engage in energy-efficient consumption
relative to a persuasive appeal. Labeling has been shown to be
especially effective when (1) it follows recent behavioral
evidence, as people seek confirmation for their attributions
before changing their attitudes (Scott & Yalch, 1980), and (2) it
is consistent with the initial self-schema of the target (Tybout &
Yalch, 1980).
4. Re-attributing previous behavior
Previous demonstrations of the labeling technique, in which
the label followed a manipulated behavior, were mostly
extensions of the foot-in-the-door procedure (Freedman &
Fraser, 1966). After a first, modest request for help, targets who
were labeled as helpful showed more compliance with a second,
largerrequestforhelpthanthosewhodidnotreceivesuchalabel
(Gorassini & Olson, 1995). The most salient interpretation of
compliance with a request in a typical foot-in-the-door situation
is pro-social, which facilitates the attribution of the behavior to a
pro-social self-concept. The label reduces the likelihood that the
behavior is attributed to other causes (e.g., social pressure). In
our case, however, the most salient interpretation of the target
behaviorisdifferentfromthelabelthatisusedtodescribeit.The
social label proposes a re-attribution of subtly induced or
spontaneous behavior (Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978). As there is
no need for the first phase behavior to be an obvious example of
a label-consistent behavior, the social labeling technique
promises to have a much broader scope than traditional foot-
in-the-door techniques for several reasons.
First,itallowsthe socialmarketertoexploit those situationsin
which a consumer spontaneously engages in pro-environmental
behavior for reasons other than ecological concern. For example,
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avoid the trouble of finding a parking space, because it is cheap,
becausetheircarbrokedown,becauseitconvenientlydropsthem
off close to their destination, or for many other reasons. Placing a
sign in the bus that describes, and thus labels, the passengers as
“responsiblecitizenschoosinganenvironmentallyfriendlymeans
of transport” might result in them perceiving their choice as an
environmentally friendly act rather than an economically rational
or convenient option and, hence, in perceiving themselves to be
concerned with the environment.
Second, one can subtly induce consumers to perform a certain
pro-environmental act by means of external motivation. This
could be the purchase of an environmentally friendly variety of a
product, like bio-products or propellant-free deodorant. The
external motivation, which is the actual cause of the purchase,
may be a price promotion, an attractive odor, or an attractive
package.Subsequently, a sociallabel isprovidedwhich attributes
the purchase to the consumers' environmental values rather than
to the external motivation. For example, one could print a
messageonthepackaging(e.g.,“[brandX]—Forthosewhocare
about their environment”). This procedure conveniently allows
therepeatedexposureofthelabeltotheconsumereachtimeheor
sheusestheproduct.Thelabelinvitesaconsumerwhoengagedin
a pro-environmental act for an alternative motivation – like
financial concerns or the preference for another intrinsic product
quality – to re-attribute that behavior to their value of caring for
the environment.
5. Distraction effects
Consumers who are aware of the actual determinants of their
behavior might realize the label is some sort of manipulation
attempt and reject its content (Burger, 1999). In order to
maximize the probability that the target accepts and acts upon
the label, it should be communicated in such a way that it
minimizes activation of persuasion knowledge (Friestad &
Wright, 1994) and elaboration on the content of the label. In the
case that information processing is constrained because people
are under a cognitive load, under time pressure, or distracted, it
is harder to engage in such reflection (Baron, Baron, & Miller,
1973; Gilbert, Krull, & Malone, 1990). This implies that social
labeling messages may have more impact when they are
accompanied by some form of distraction (Bither, 1972;
Kumkale & Albarracín, 2004). Campbell and Kirmani (2000)
observed that when their participants were cognitively “busy”
(i.e., when they had to perform other simultaneous and
cognitively demanding tasks), they were more prone to judge
a salesperson giving a promotional talk as sincere and thus be
sensitive to his arguments. This effect even holds when the
ulterior (persuasive) motive of the salesperson is highly salient
(Bosmans & Warlop, 2005). This suggests that if cognitive
resources are limited or directed elsewhere when the target
receives the social label, the probability of accepting the label as
a truthful self-description would increase and, hence, so would
the impact of this information on subsequent decisions.
These effects might be accounted for in literature on
mindlessness in consumer decision making (e.g., Dijksterhuis,
Smith, Van Baaren, & Wigboldus, 2005). Research in this area
proposes that complying with a request is often a rather
automatic response that is especially prone to occur under
conditions of relative mindlessness. For example, based on dual
process theories (Chaiken & Trope, 1999), Fennis, Das, and
Pruyn (2004) showed that the Disrupt-Then-Reframe technique
(Davis & Knowles, 1999) works because the disruption acts as a
distracter. It induces mindlessness and reduces counter-
argumentation. When cognitive resources are scarce, people
are not capable of processing message characteristics carefully
and tend to rely on peripheral cues, such as a social label
(Chaiken, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).
It seems reasonable to assume that these distraction
conditions often apply in the everyday consumer context.
Both the purchase and use of products, which carry labeling
messages, are embedded in a continuous stream of mental
activities (Alba & Marmorstein, 1992). When coming across a
social label, either while paying at the cash register and trying to
remember where the car is parked or when going over that day's
appointments while applying deodorant in the morning, our
limited cognitive resources are directed elsewhere. We expect
the labeling procedure to work in common, cognitively
demanding circumstances.
6. Overview of the studies
In the first study, we tested whether a pro-environmental
label that follows an alternatively motivated behavior elicits
pro-environmental behavior and verified whether cognitive
distractions facilitate the labeling effect. In Study 2 we tested
whether the social label indeed motivates people to re-attribute
their previous behavior. We also tested whether distractions
reduce contemplation on the veracity of the self-description that
the label provides. We went on to verify whether the labeling
effect generalizes to situations in which cognitive impairment
occurs during choice making rather than during exposure to the
label (Study 3) and to other types of cognitive impairments
(Study 4).
6.1. Study 1
Allen (1982) tested the potential of social labeling for mass
communication. As in that study, we compared the effect of
providing a social label with that of a content-based persuasion
message that communicates arguments in favor of pro-
environmental behavior. However, we used a task that provokes
a pro-environmental choice that is not driven by pro-
environmental values but rather by a subtle external motivation.
The subsequently provided label suggests an internal re-
attribution of that choice to personally held pro-environmental
values. We hypothesized that the social label would be more
effective if the participants' cognitive resources are impaired or
directed elsewhere at the moment of processing it. If they are
not distracted, however, we predict that elaborate processing of
the content of the social label will lead to its dismissal. There-
fore we expect social labels to be ineffective when participants
are not distracted.
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6.1.1.1. Participants and design. One hundred and one
undergraduate students (40 male, 61 female) were paid 6 € for
participationinthisstudy,whichtookabout50min.Uponarrival,
groupsoffivetoeightwereseatedinfrontofacomputerscreenin
a semi-closed cubicle. The experimental design included two
between-subjectfactors:communicationtype(label,explicitplea,
and control) and cognitive load (load and no load).
6.1.1.2. Procedure and materials
6.1.1.2.1. TV-choice task. First, participants completed a
TV-choice task on paper (adapted from Verplanken & Holland,
2002). This task was meant to provoke an environmentally
friendly choice. We constructed a list of seven TVs, which were
rated on seven attributes (image quality, image quality in
sunlight, sound quality, remote control quality, ecological
aspects, ease of programming and speed of changing channels).
This information was represented in a 7 by 7 brand-by-attribute
matrix (see Fig. 1). The seven TVs were listed in the rows of the
matrix, represented by letters A to G. The seven attributes were
listed in the columns of the matrix. One offive possible symbols
(−−,−, 0,+,++) evaluated every TVon each attribute. Above the
choice matrix, a short legend explained what the attributes
referred to. The ‘ecological aspects’ attribute referred to
electricity consumption and the degree to which the TV-set
contains polluting components and non-recyclable materials.
TV-set ‘C’ was superior for both image and sound quality.
These dimensions were pre-tested (N=54) as the most
important features in the choice for a TV-set. Consistently, all
participants chose this TV. Importantly, TV C was also rated
best on ‘ecological aspects’ (+). This way, participants were
provoked to make an externally motivated environmentally
friendly choice.
6.1.1.2.2. Communication type and cognitive load manip-
ulations. Subsequently, participants were randomly assigned
to one of three conditions. Those in the labeling condition
received feedback on their choice. This feedback communicated
the social label. Instructions that appeared on the screen
explained that the TV-choice task was used by a well-known
consumer organization to identify different segments of
consumers. For every possible TV-choice, a description was
given of the typical consumer choosing that TV-set. For TV C,
the description said that the typical consumer choosing this
option was ‘very concerned with the environment and ecolog-
ically conscious’. A second group, assigned to the explicit plea
condition, read an explicit plea for ecologically conscious con-
sumer behavior. Additionally, it provided some tips for reducing
waste production and efficient recycling (see Appendix A). A
third, control group did not get any information during this
phase.
Within each of the three groups, half of the participants were
assigned to the cognitive load condition. The cognitive load task
consisted of remembering a six-digit number (Shiv &
Fedorikhin, 1999). Participants were instructed to do so after
entering the TV-set of their choice and before getting feedback.
After reading the social label, the explicit plea, or nothing at all,
they were asked to recall the number they were supposed to
remember. Five participants (5%) failed to reproduce the correct
number, and they were discarded from further analysis.
6.1.1.2.3. Dependent measure: the product-choice task.
After 15 min of unrelated filler tasks, participants completed a
product-choice task. This task consisted of making 10 product
choices. Participants were presented with 10 product pairs: five
filler pairs and five critical ones. In each critical pair, one
product was a more environmentally friendly but more
expensive alternative of the other (see Appendix B). We
asked participants to indicate which product they would pick if
they were to purchase them now. The critical product categories
were cookies (differing in the amount of plastic used for
wrapping), kitchen paper, deodorants, energy-efficient lamps,
and detergents. For eight product categories, the price of the
more environmentally friendly product was 1.05 €, whereas the
less environmentally friendly product cost 0.95 €. For the
lamps, the prices were 1.50 € and 1.30 €, respectively, and for
detergents, they were 1.40 € and 1.30 €. These prices were pre-
tested in a different sample of the same student population
(N=34) by informing participants about the shop value of a
certain object and asking them how much they would be willing
to pay for a more ecological variant of that product. We used the
median price mentioned for the ecological products in the
choice task. The 10 product choices appeared in random order
on the screen. We counted the number of environmentally
friendly choices participants made on the five critical items,
which constituted our dependent variable.
6.1.2. Results
We conducted a three (communication type: label, explicit
plea,andcontrol)bytwo(cognitiveload)ANOVA.Thisrevealed
a significant interaction between communication type and
Fig. 1. The brand-by-attribute matrix of the TV-choice task.
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significant main effect of communication type (F(2, 90)=2.86;
p=0.06) (seeTable 1).As expected, withinthe noloadcondition,
communication type had no effect (F(2, 90)=0.93, p=0.37),
whereas in the load condition, it did (F(2, 90)=7.23, pb0.01).
Tukey pairwise comparisons showed that, under cognitive load,
participants in the social label condition made more environmen-
tal choices than either those in the explicit plea (pb0.02) or the
controlcondition(pb0.01).Wefoundnodifferencesbetweenthe
explicit plea and control group within the load condition
(p=0.77).
A further test showed that, within the social label condition,
cognitive load led to more environmental choices than the
absence of load (F(1, 90)=9.44, pb0.01). Neither in the
explicit plea condition (F(1, 90)=1.44, p=0.23) nor in the
control condition (Fb1) did we observe a cognitive load effect.
6.1.3. Discussion
We found evidence that cognitive distractions moderate the
impact of a labeling procedure. Processing the label while
cognitive resources were directed elsewhere resulted in using it
as a guide in subsequent decisions. When cognitive resources
were not limited, the social label had no effect. We assume that
cognitive distractions, such as load, disrupt the application of
persuasion knowledge because they impair reflection on the
actual reason of the TV-choice. If that is true, then motivating
participants to reflect on the actual reasons for their purchase,
after receiving the social label when mentally distracted, should
suppress the labeling effect. We will test this hypothesis in the
next study.
6.2. Study 2
The aim of this study was to replicate the labeling effect of
Study 1 and provide additional insight into the process. We
tested the hypothesis that cognitive distractions disrupt the
application of persuasion knowledge because they impair
reflection on the actual reason for the TV-choice. We used the
same procedure as in Study 1 and added a factor. We asked half
of the participants to indicate, after completing the TV-choice
task and the subsequent manipulation, how important each of
the seven attributes on which the TVs were rated had been. We
also asked the other half of the participants to complete the
importance rating task but only after the dependent measure
was completed. This allowed us to verify the hypothesis that the
social label results in a re-attribution of an alternatively
motivated behavior. We dropped the explicit plea condition
from the design because it did not add extra information in the
first study.
6.2.1. Method
6.2.1.1. Participants and design. One hundred fifty-eight
undergraduate students received 6 € for participation in the
experimental session, which lasted about 50 min. The
experimental design included 3 between-subject variables.
These were communication type (social label versus control),
cognitive load (load versus no load), and reflection (reflection
on TV-choice versus no reflection).
6.2.1.2. Materials and procedure. Upon arrival, groups of
five to eight participants were requested to take a seat in front of
a computer screen in a semi-closed cubicle. First, they
completed the TV-choice task. Four participants (2.5%) did
not pick the TV-set that scored higher on image and sound
quality and were discarded from further analysis. Then, we
manipulated communication type and cognitive load as we did
in Study 1. Directly after these manipulations, half of the
participants were asked to indicate to what degree each of the
seven attributes had determined their TV-choice on a 25-point
scale (ranging from not important at all to very important). We
reasoned that this task elicits reflection on the initial TV-choice
and would allow participants who received the label under
cognitive load to contemplate the actual reason for choosing the
TV-set they chose. After 15 min of unrelated filler tasks, all
participants completed the product-choice task. Finally, those
participants who did not indicate the importance of the seven
attributes previously, did so at the end of the procedure.
6.2.2. Results
6.2.2.1. Product-choice task. We conducted a two (communi-
cation type: label versus control) by two (cognitive load: load
versus no load) by two (reflection on TV-choice versus no
reflection) ANOVA. This resulted in a significant three-way
interaction(F(1,146)=5.16,pb0.03)(seeTable 2).Wereplicated
the results of Study 1 in the no reflection condition (F(1, 146)=
8.84, pb0.01). Contrasts showed that the social label produced
more environmentally friendly choices when communicated
under load than in the no load condition (F(1, 146)=9.07,
pb0.01). In the control condition, cognitive load had no effect
Table 1
Number of environmental choices made as a result of communication type and
cognitive load at encoding (Study 1)
Communication
type
Cognitive load at encoding
Load No load
Mean SD Mean SD
Label 3.67 0.90 2.53 1.01
Explicit plea 2.56 1.26 3.00 0.94
Control 2.29 1.07 2.65 1.06
Table 2
Number of environmental choices made as a function of communication type,





Cognitive load at encoding
Load No load
Mean SD Mean SD
Label No reflection 2.94 1.25 1.86 1.24
Reflection 2.16 1.21 2.33 1.06
Control No reflection 1.62 0.86 2.00 1.02
Reflection 2.24 0.90 2.25 1.24
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participants who were labeled made more ecological choices
than those who were not (F(1, 146)=13.49, pb0.01). Within the
no load condition, there was no effect of communication type,
Fb1.
As expected, having participants reflect on their TV-choice
suppressed the labeling effect. Within the reflection on TV-
choice condition, the main effects and the interaction between
communication type and load did not reach significance (all
Fsb1) (see Table 2).
6.2.2.2. Ratings of attribute-importance in the TV-choice. We
calculated the relative importance attached to the environmental
attribute for those participants who indicated the importance of
each of the seven attributes at the end of the experiment (i.e., the
no reflection condition only). We divided the rating given to this
attribute by the sum of the ratings given to the seven attributes.
An increase in the importance attached to the environmental
attribute would mean that the manipulation was successful at
suggesting a re-attribution of the TV-choice. We found an
interaction effect (F(1, 76)=4.59, pb0.04), as shown in Table 3.
Within the labeling group, those who received the distracting
load task rated the environmental attribute as more important
than those who did not (F(1, 76)=4.59, pb0.04). Within the
control group, there was no effect of cognitive load (Fb1).
Under cognitive load, those who received the label rated the
environmental dimension as more important than those who
were not labeled (F(1, 76)=6.39, pb0.02). Without load, there
was no effect of communication type (Fb1).
6.2.3. Discussion
This study added more insight into the process of social
labeling in two ways. First, we obtained support for our
hypothesis that cognitive load facilitates the labeling effect
because it reduces the activation of persuasion knowledge.
Processing the label under load seems to interfere with
participants questioning the truthfulness of the label. By making
them reflect on their TV-choice immediately after receiving the
label, however, we allowed the participants to correct for the re-
attribution that the label proposed. Second, our finding that
importance ratings changed as a result of cognitive load and
communication type suggests that the impact of the label
extends beyond the mere self-perception process to an active re-
attribution of the initial TV-choice. The label influences the
interpretation of previous behavior and makes environmental
values more salient (Alba et al., 1991; Snyder & Uranowitz,
1978). Several theories predict that the salience of a certain
value increases the probability of acting upon it (Albarracin &
Wyer, 2001; Bem, 1972; Schwarz et al., 1991). We have shown
that it is possible to increase the salience of a certain value, in
this case environmental friendliness, by (re)attributing an
externally provoked act to that motive.
6.3. Study 3
For practical purposes, it is important to know whether a
social label can influence a targets' behavior, even if it has been
processed with full attention. We explore this possibility in this
and the following study. Work on assimilation and contrast
effects (Martin, Seta, & Crelia, 1990; Meyers-Levy & Tybout,
1997) showed that whether possible counter-arguments regard-
ing an issue are retrieved later is determined by the availability
of cognitive resources at the moment of retrieval. Findings of
Schwarz and Bless (1992) and Meyers-Levy and Tybout (1997)
claim that the same factors determine the effect of a contextual
cue (e.g., the label), regardless of whether this influence occurs
at encoding or at judgment (when retrieving the cue). Therefore,
we predict that the label will be effective if participants are
cognitively distracted at the moment of decision making, even if
they processed the label with full attention. In this case,
persuasion knowledge that was activated at the moment of
processing the label will not be recalled at the moment of using
the label as a guide to make decisions. We verify this hypothesis
in the present study. We replicate Study 1, changing one aspect
in the design. In this study the cognitive load task is
implemented at the moment of making ecology-related
decisions and not at the moment of processing the social label.
6.3.1. Method
6.3.1.1. Participants and design. Eighty-six undergraduates
participated in this study and were paid 6 € for participation in
an experimental session, which lasted about 50 min. We
manipulated two between-subjects factors: communication type
(label versus control) and cognitive load (load versus no load).
6.3.1.2. Procedure and materials. First, participants complet-
ed the TV-choice task and were randomly assigned to one of
two conditions. One group received the social label as feedback
on their choice, and the other group did not get any information.
Six participants (7%) did not choose the superior TV-set and
were discarded from further analysis. After 15 min of unrelated
filler tasks, participants completed the same product-choice task
used in Studies 1 and 2. Orthogonally to the communication
manipulation, we asked half the participants to remember a six-
digit number while making their product choices.
6.3.2. Results
An ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between
communication and cognitive load (F(1, 76)=6.87, pb0.01)
(see Table 4). As predicted, participants in the labeling
condition who made their choices under cognitive load chose
more environmental products than those who were not
cognitively distracted (F(1, 76)=8.93, pb0.01). In the control
Table 3
Importance attached to the ecology-dimension as a function of communication
type and load at encoding (Study 2)
Communication
type
Cognitive load at encoding
Load No load
Mean SD Mean SD
Label 0.15 0.07 0.10 0.06
Control 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.07
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load condition, labeling led to more ecological choices than in
the control condition (F(1, 76)=9.91, pb0.01). In the condition
without cognitive load, we did not observe a labeling effect
(Fb1).
6.3.3. Discussion
As predicted, distracting cognitive resources at the moment
of making purchase decisions allowed the labeling effect to
emerge. This suggests that consumers recall the persuasion
knowledge associated with the information provided by the
label when cognitive resources are available. Under load,
however, this recall becomes suppressed. This finding implies
that a labeling message should work unless the consumer is
fully focused on the task at hand, both while processing the
label and while purchasing a product. If at either time attention
is distracted, persuasion knowledge is either not activated or not
recalled, and the social label will influence purchase decisions.
Most situations in our daily lives feature a large number of
stimuli that compete for our limited cognitive resources.
Therefore, we argue that cases in which consumers are fully
focused on both critical occasions in the labeling procedure are
rather exceptional.
6.4. Study 4
In the previous studies, we showed that a social label that
suggests a re-attribution of previous behavior influences
subsequent choices only if its communication is accompanied
by a distraction. This distraction either disrupts the application of
persuasion knowledge or interferes with the recall of counter-
arguments that resulted from the activation of persuasion
knowledge. We argued before that the typical context in which
the consumer makes decisions is cognitively demanding.
Therefore the demonstrated social labeling effects are likely to
applyinaconsumersetting.Inthisstudy,weintendedtoreplicate
the distraction effect, using a more ecologically valid type of
distraction manipulation: repeated decision making.
Previous research has suggested that repeated decision
making increases the impact of salient or accessible information
in consumer judgment (Bruyneel, Dewitte, Vohs, & Warlop,
2006). These effects appear similar to those of cognitive
distractions (Rottenstreich, Sood, & Brenner, 2007); hence,
repeated decision making, which prevails in many consumer
contexts, may also increase the impact of a social label. We
build on the results of Study 3, which indicate that the social
label can still affect behavior even in the case that a social label
has been processed elaborately and its content is rejected if a
distracter disrupts the application of persuasion knowledge at
the time of the decision. In the present study, it is the act of
making decisions itself which provides the distraction, rather
than an artificial cognitive load manipulation. We predict that a
social labeling communication, in which the label has been
processed with full attention, will not influence initial choices in
a task when full cognitive resources are available, thereby
replicating our null effects in the no load conditions of previous
studies. After several trials, however, we expect the social label
to increase pro-environmental decision making, compared to a
control condition.
6.4.1. Method
6.4.1.1. Participants and design. One hundred fifty-seven
undergraduate students (65 men and 91 women) participated in
the experimental session, which lasted about 50 min, in return
for 6 €. We included one between-subjects factor (communi-
cation type: label versus explicit plea) and one within-subjects
factor (decision trial) in the design.
6.4.1.2. Procedure and materials
6.4.1.2.1. Manipulation. Like the previous studies, partici-
pants started with the TV-choice task. Eight participants (5.7%)
were discarded from analysis for not choosing the superior set.
AfterchoosingtheirpreferredTV-set,respondentswererandomly
assigned to one of two communication type conditions. As
explained, we expected that repeated choice making would
constitutea strainon participants' cognitive resources.Therefore,
weexpectedtheimpactofthesociallabeltoemergeafterrepeated
choices, as in previous circumstances with cognitive load. We
wonderedwhether there wouldbea similar effectwithanexplicit
plea. After all, the flaws associated with such an approach, which
wediscussedintheintroduction,likereactance(Brehm&Brehm,
1981), cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) and thinking about
costs of the promoted behavior (Warlop et al., 2003), all result
from cognitive elaboration on the information the plea provided.
Perhapstherepeateddecisionwoulddecreasethesalienceofthese
ponderings. To constitute a conservative test of our hypothesis,
we therefore selected the explicit plea condition as a control
condition in this study.
6.4.1.2.2. Repeated choices, public good dilemma. After
15 min of unrelated filler tasks, participants completed the
dependent measure. We constructed a repeated choices public
good game, which was framed as an ecological task. In a public
good game, all players can choose to invest a part of their
resources in the public good. The public good is obtained only
when the contributions pass a certain threshold (the provision
point). Once obtained, all participants involved can equally enjoy
thepublicgood,irrespectiveofthesizeoftheircontribution.Ifthe
public good is not obtained, all participants lose their invested
resources.We asked participantsto imagine that theywere tobuy
10 bags of potato chips for a party. The potato chips alternatives
were either packaged in conventional or in bio-degradable bags.
Participants had to indicate how many items of each type they
would purchase (summing to 10). Instructions on the computer
Table 4
Product choices as a function of communication type and cognitive load in the
decision phase (Study 3)
Communication
type
Cognitive load in the decision phase
Load No load
Mean SD Mean SD
Label 3.15 1.46 1.90 1.18
Control 1.76 1.25 2.09 1.41
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expensive (1.35 € versus 1.10 €) because they had a lower
market-share. An increased demand for chips packaged in bio-
degradable bags (i.e., the contribution) would lead to lowering of
thepricesforthistypeofpackaginginthefollowingtrials(i.e.,the
public good). A group of eight participants played the public
good game. They were told that if the group as a whole would
buy a sufficient number of bio-degradable bags (i.e., the
threshold), the price of this type of bags would drop in the
following trial of the game, in which they had to buy 10 more
bags (the price of the chips wrapped in conventional bags was
fixed throughout the game). Participants played three such trials.
We did not specify the number of bio-degradable bags they
collectively needed to buy to produce the price drop. Had we
done so, participants would be tempted to apply the “equal cost
share” strategy, contributing his or her fair share to obtain the
public good, in this case, the price drop (Bagnoli & McKee,
1991). After each trial, all participants received bogus feedback
that indicated that the public good was not obtained.
6.4.2. Results
We conducted a repeated measures ANOVA with one
between-subjects variable (communication type: social label
versus explicit plea) and the three repeated trials of the public
good game as a within-subjects variable. We found significant
differences between trials (F(2, 294)=48.94, pb0.01), which
are presented in Table 5. In trial 2, participants chose more bio-
degradable bags than in trial 1 (F(1, 147)=40.08, pb0.01), and
in trial 3 they chose even more than in trial 2 (F(1, 147)=17.47,
pb0.01). This is evidence from the fact that participants were
motivated to obtain the public good (Rondeau, Schulze, & Poe,
1999). More importantly, we found a significant interaction
between communication type and decision trial, F(2, 294)=
5.89, pb0.01. In trials 1 and 2, we did not find differences
betweencommunicationconditions(F'sb1).Intrial3,however,
participants who had received the social label chose more bio-
degradable bags than those in the explicit plea condition (F(1,
147)=9.30, pb0.01). In the labeling condition, participants
increased their share of bio-degradable bags compared to trial 2
(F(1, 147)=23.75), but this was not the case for participants in
the explicit plea condition (Fb1).
6.4.3. Discussion
This study showed that repeated decision making, a very
common activity for a consumer, produces sufficient distraction
for the social labeling effect to show up, even when the label
was processed with full attention. In a repeated public goods
game, participants initially chose, on average, a fifty–fifty
distribution between traditional and bio-degradable bags. As
this proved not to be sufficient for achieving the public good
(i.e., the price drop), in trial 2 the share of bio-degradable bags
increased, indicating participants were motivated to obtain the
public good at a personal expense. In trial 3, the distribution
remained constant in the explicit plea, whereas in the label
condition, the share of bio-degradable bags further increased.
The results in this third trial are comparable to those of the
cognitive load conditions of the previous studies. This suggests
that the suppression of the persuasion knowledge effect
generalizes to other circumstances that distract cognitive
resources. As conditions of cognitive load or repeated choosing
are prevalent in our daily lives, this finding suggests that the
social labeling procedure is widely applicable. Findings in the
explicit plea group in the first and the fourth study add to the
observation made in the introduction that providing people with
‘food for thought’ is not an efficient strategy by itself. This is
certainly true in domains where the attitude towards the
behavior (e.g., paying a higher price for the same functionality)
is more negative than the attitude towards the overarching value
(i.e., being an environmentally conscious consumer).
7. General discussion
Earlier demonstrations of the social labeling technique
showed that providing a consumer with a social label of prior
behavior stimulated future similar behavior. In these demon-
strations, the most salient meaning of the labeled behavior (e.g.,
being tidy) was consistent with the social label (e.g., tidiness).
Our findings extended the social labeling technique to behaviors
(e.g., buying the best TV-set) of which the most salient meaning
is not consistent with the social label (e.g., environmental). This
extension removes the challenging requirement that the desired
behavior (e.g., tidy) should occur spontaneously in order to
boost the accompanying self-conception. Consequently, our
extension substantially increases the applicability of the
technique for social marketing applications. While we tested
the effect of this procedure on ecological behavior, it should be
applicable to other areas of socially desirable behavior, like
health behavior, voting, and altruistic behavior.
Social labeling proved effective only when cognitive
resources were constrained, either at the time of the commu-
nication or at the time of the decision. We argued that cognitive
constraint is the rule rather than the exception in real life
because the majority of our daily decisions are part of a stream
of continuous and overlapping mental activities. We further
argued that the effect of cognitive distractions is due to the
suppression of persuasion knowledge activation. Our findings
contribute to the literature on mindlessness in consumer
decision making (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al., 2005). Consistently,
our data suggest that consumers are unable to reject a piece of
information as untrue or invalid when processing it uncon-
sciously (e.g., Gilbert et al., 1990).
Previous research has suggested that such subtle techniques,
requiring minimal conscious thought, may be more effective in
the longer term than campaigns that provoke people to
Table 5





Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Label 5.17 3.18 6.90 3.45 8.65 2.73
Explicit plea 5.30 3.52 6.73 3.56 7.06 3.54
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by providing arguments (Albarracin & Wyer, 2001). Albarracin
and McNatt (2005) studied the effects of past behavior on
attitudes towards university policies. Participants were led to
believe that they had unconsciously supported or opposed a
social policy. This feedback had direct effects on attitudes about
the policy and the expected outcomes of the policy. Self-
perception effects lasted longer than more specific elaborations
about the outcomes of the policy.
We included an explicit plea condition in Studies 1 and 4 to
compare the effect of our labeling procedure with the practice of
providing argument-based messages. In neither case did these
explicit messages increase pro-environmental decision making.
However, we do not dispute the value of educational campaign-
ing. Lack of knowledge is an important predictor of non-
compliance to socially desirable behavior in many domains
(Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). Our results do suggest that this
approach can be complemented with more direct behavior-
inducing instruments. In the case of social labeling, this effect
may proceed automatically via self-perceptions.
Social labeling is related to techniques that use descriptive
social norms as a persuasion technique (Cialdini, 2003; Cialdini
et al., 1990). However, rather than invoking social norms, social
labeling suggests the a priori existence of personal norms or
valuestoengageinacertainpro-socialbehavior.Ourdatashowed
that describing consumers as having certain values increases the
chance of them acting upon those values later on. Study 2
suggestedthatsociallabelingevenresults inconsumerschanging
their interpretation of previous behavior such that it is in line with
thevaluesuggestedbythelabel.Especiallyinsituationswherethe
social descriptive norm is not to engage in a certain socially
desirable behavior (e.g., taking public transport instead of one's
owncar),apersuasiontoolsuggestingsuchpersonalnormscould
be a useful alternative.
It is appropriate here to consider some issues regarding the
ethics of employing such a technique. Business ethics involve
considering the costs associated with such behavioral changes
and weighing them against the potential benefits for that person
and for society at large (Laczniak & Murphy, 1993; Rangan,
Karim, & Sandberg, 1996). With respect to the costs associated
with the application of such a technique, one can wonder
whether it is harmful to use a tool that may change the way
people perceive themselves. This seems not to be the case if the
self-perception that the label suggests is not inconsistent with
the consumer's present self-perception and if the label is
evaluated positively. Our analysis of construal level theory
(Trope & Liberman, 2000) suggests that the long-term goals
that consumers harbor can be overridden by short-term self-
interested motives. The general interest people seem to have in
environmental issues suggests that a social labeling technique
might remind them of their own goals and help them to pursue
that goal, in spite of other temptations. In those situations in
which the ultimate goal of the social marketer is supported by
the majority of a target population, a tool like social labeling
seems acceptable. Manipulating consumers to act in ways that
are not consistent with their self-concept, however, may have
long-term costs that are difficult to justify.
Social labeling could be used in the context of for-profit
marketing as well. Labeling a consumer as a member of a
certain brand community or merely as an individual who could
benefit from acquiring a certain product may increase the
likelihood that s/he he will (re-)purchase products of that brand.
The benefits for the consumer as well as for society at large are
less clear. In this case, the application of such a technique is
more likely to be morally questionable.
Futureresearchmaylookintogeneralizationofthistechnique.
First, there is reason to assume that if the social label is
inconsistent with the self-perception the target person already
maintains, it will not be accepted and acted upon (Tybout &
Yalch, 1980). We also mentioned that desirability of the label
plays a role in the ethical analysis, but the question about the
relative desirability of the personality trait or values that the label
communicates remains worth pursuing. People are motivated to
elevate their self-conceptions and to protect their self-concepts
from negative information (Sedikides & Strube, 1997) and may
be more willing to act upon the communication of a desirable
social label. Therefore, people for whom “being environmentally
friendly”soundspositiveshouldbepersuadedmorethanthosefor
whom it sounds negative. Other labels a social marketing
campaign may wish to use (e.g., eating healthy, engaging in
physicalactivity,buyingfairtradeproducts)mayhavepositiveor
negative associations for different segments of consumers.
Perhaps people do accept labels that elevate their self-concept
incaseswhencognitiveresourcesareabundant.Althoughtheuse
ofnegativelabelsisquestionableethically,researchintothistopic
may be warranted; it is possible that labels that are evaluated
negatively are rejected, even under cognitive load conditions. In
any event, it is important to extend our understanding of social
labeling effects as these are easily applicable to market socially
desirable or pro-social behavior.
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Appendix A. Information given in the explicit plea condition
of Studies 1 and 4
Reduce the mountain of waste to a little pile
Did you know that you produce an average of 1.5 kg of waste
everyday?Thiswayyouaddsomeextrakilostothealreadyhuge
mountain of waste. We should try to reduce the amount of waste
we produce in order to preserve our environment.
With these easy to follow guidelines you can already make a
difference:
1. Purchase less disposable products
Avoid product which you can only use once
286 G. Cornelissen et al. / Intern. J. of Research in Marketing 24 (2007) 278–2882. Pay attention to the packaging
Purchase product which have not packaging or with environ-
mentally friendly packaging. Bio-degradable or recyclable
packaging is better for the environment that traditional ones.
Glass is better than plastic.
3. Sort your waste
By sorting your waste, much of it can be recycled, so less of it
needs to be processed and stored or incinerated.
Please contribute to a better environment and a cleaner world
for everyone!
Appendix B. Product attribute specifications of the
product-choice task
Product Choice A Choice B
Cookies Price 1.05 € 0.95 €
Packaging 25 units in
1 plastic wrapper
Each unit wrapped individually
Kitchen
paper
Price 1.05 € 0.95 €
Paper 100% recycled Non-recycled






Price 1.30 € 1.50 €
Type Regular Saving light bulbs
Detergent Price 1.30 € 1.40 €
Type Regular Ecological packaging and content
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